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Minimum Streamflows:
The Legislative Alternatives
I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "minimum streamflow" appears to have several
different meanings. For some it carries the connotation of main-
taining a constant flow of water in a stream bed. To others it
means preserving a river or stream in its natural condition. And
yet to others it means the preservation of instream values for
the protection of fish, wildlife, and aesthetics. While maintain-
ing a constant flow and preserving a stream in its natural condi-
tion are noble goals, they are unrealistic in Nebraska given the
fact the Nebraska economy is dependent on agriculture which,
in turn, is to a large extent dependent on irrigation.
Those who advocate a constant flow in Nebraska streams1
must recognize that Nebraska streams, like virtually all natural
drainage systems, have a history of seasonal fluctuations. 2 This
is especially evident in the Platte River where the snowmelt in
the Colorado and Wyoming mountains maintains a high flow
level in the late spring and early summer.3 This high flow level
practically ceases during late summer and fall, causing the
Platte to dry up in several areas. In recent years this pattern of
intermittency has increased due to the expanded use of irriga-
tion by Nebraska farmers. As one commentator has pointed out,
"the adverse environmental effects resulting from largely
unregulated surface water withdrawals are becoming increas-
ingly evident in Nebraska. Many streams are seasonally dry or
nearly so due to diversions and/or direct pumping for irrigation
purposes. '4 Even though the dry periods have been expanded in
recent years due to increased use of sophisticated irrigation
1. Pesek, A Case for Protected Streamflows, NEB. RESOURCES, Sept. 1974, at
3. (Tom Pesek is a biologist with the Neb. Nat. Resources Comm'n.)
2. Dirmeyer, More on Protected Streamflows, NEB. RESOURCES, June 1975, at
3. (Richard Dirmeyer is general manager of the Cent. Neb. Pub. Power &
Irr. Dist.)
3. Id.
4. Pesek, supra note 1, at 3.
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techniques, seasonal fluctuation was clearly a characteristic of
the Platte River prior to the inception of large scale irrigation.5
Advocates of storage reservoirs point out that prior to 1900 the
dry periods of the Platte were much longer than they are pre-
sently, and that the shortening of the dry spells is due in part to
the construction of several major storage reservoirs in the
Platte River basin.6 Because of the seasonal fluctuations, main-
taining a constant flow in rivers such as the Platte would be
impossible without the use of major storage reservoirs to store
spring flood water for later discharge during the summer and
fall dry spells.7 However, such artificial maintenance of
constant flows would probably be as detrimental to the environ-
ment and fragile ecosystems as is the constant lowering of
stream levels now taking place through the over-appropriation
of Nebraska streams and groundwater mining. To maintain the
quality of the environment, streams should not be artificially
maintained or artificially reduced. Rather, the streams should
be maintained as close to their natural state as possible.
Not all Nebraska streams have seasonal fluctuation like the
Platte. The Loup River is known as one of the most even-flowing
streams in the nation; however, in recent years even the Loup
has exhibited signs which indicate excessive irrigation.8 In 1976,
portions of twenty-one streams in northeastern Nebraska be-
came totally dry and it was estimated that the fish kill during
the summer of 1976 was the largest in recorded history.9 Al-
though some of the dewatering of Nebraska streams is due to
the drought which has plagued Nebraska in recent years, it is
clear that irrigation, both surface and subsurface, has contrib-
uted a great deal to the dewatering. It is important to recognize
5. Dirmeyer, supra note 2, at 3.
6. The author states that "[tihe difference between now and then relates to the
major storage reservoirs-such as Seminoe, Pathfinder, Alcova, Glendo
and Guernsey in Wyoming and McConaughy in Nebraska." Id.
7. "Legally adopted" minimum streamflows in Nebraska as ad-
vocated by Mr. Pesek in the last issue of this magazine, in my
opinion, cannot be achieved by legislation alone, at least, not on the
Platte River.
A much better .approach to achieving minumum flow in the
Platte River is to continue the process of river regulations started
in the late 1800's.
Id.
8. Pesek, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Rupp, An Argument for a Minimum Stream Flow Law, NEB. NEW LAND
REV., Winter 1977, at 1. (Lee Rupp is Dist. III fisheries supervisor for the
Norfolk, Neb., office of the Game & Parks Comm'n.). See, Where has all
the Water Gone?, NEBRASKALAND, July 1977, at 32.
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that widespread mining of groundwater, as well as surface wa-
ter withdrawals, has an adverse effect on Nebraska streams. It
is a combination of drought, excessive stream withdrawals, and
groundwater mining that contributes to the lowering of stream
levels.
Those who advocate the use of minimum streamflow laws to
maintain Nebraska rivers and streams in a natural state must
realize that irrigation is a necessary component of the farm-
based Nebraska economy.10 But the Nebraska environment
must not be blindly sacrificed in the name of economic devel-
opment. The use of water like the use of any "precious natural
resource should proceed in an orderly, logical fashion, with a lot
of good old-fashion 'common-sense' involved. The current irri-
gation development appears to be more of an unrestrained,
headlong exploitation, reminiscent of the goldrush days."" Be-
cause maintaining a constant flow in Nebraska streams is an
unrealistic goal given the seasonal fluctuation and the need for
at least some irrigation, the phrase "minimum streamflow" as
used in this article will mean the preservation of instream
values-fish, wildlife, recreation, aesthetics, and the environ-
ment. The preservation of instream values is a realistic goal-
one that can be accomplished through increased awareness and
progressive legislation.
Most environmental groups realize that maintaining streams
in a totally natural state is unrealistic, but they would like to
maintain the streams in an "as close to natural state" as is
possible. The National Audubon Society has set forth as one of
its goals to "[w]ork to preserve natural stream ecosystems, op-
posing destructive channelization, dam, and diversion pro-
jects," and to advocate "floodplain and watershed management
to replace costly and ecologically unsound flood-control pro-
jects."'1 2 The establishment of minimum streamflows is also one
of the Sierra Club's top priorities. The Nebraska Chapter of the
Sierra Club has issued a water statement which provides in
part:
Legislation should be developed that recognizes and protects instream
uses for scenic, recreational and fish and wildlife concerns.
Minimum historical stream flows for all Nebraska's rivers to maintain
current ecosystems should be immediately established.
10. "There is no question that irrigation has a tremendously beneficial and
'stabilizing' effect on our economy." Rupp, supa note 9, at 3.
11. Id.
12. Letter from Pauline D. Plaza, biologist for the Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, to
Lynn Hendrix (Oct. 25, 1977). See also AUDUBON, March 1975, at 132.
MINIMUM STREAMFLOWS
A moratorium on all additional stream withdrawal in areas where the
current ecosystem is in jeopardy should be immediately enacted. Ex-
cept for domestic purposes.13
The Nebraska chapters of the Audubon Society and the Sierra
Club, as well as other environmental groups, have been active in
lobbying for minimum streamflow laws in the Nebraska Legis-
lature.14
Despite the dewatering of many Nebraska streams through
overappropriation, the Department of Water Resources
continues to issue new permits to withdraw water from lakes
and streams.15 At the present time the effective curtailment of
excessive groundwater withdrawals does not appear foresee-
able. It is therefore evident that the lowering and dewatering of
Nebraska streams are products of water laws that fail to recog-
nize the value of instream uses-laws which allow a stream to be
appropriated until the bed is dry and laws which allow ground-
water mining until an aquifer is empty. "Most of the few exist-
ing water laws we have on the books are either archaic, conflict-
ing, or simply don't go far enough. It has suddenly become
obvious that development has overrun the controlling mecha-
nisms.' 16
There is no doubt that some form of minimum streamflow
legislation is needed.
The present situation throughout Nebraska emphasizes the critical
need for the establishment of a system of protected streamflows in the
state. Such a system, legally adopted and enforced, could insure the
maintenance of minimum flows in perennial streams and, at the same
time, allow reasonable surface water withdrawals for agricultural and
13. A Water Statement by the Nebraska Chapter of the Sierra Club, contained
in a letter from Robert Warrick, Chairman of the Neb. Chapter of the
Sierra Club, to Lynn Hendrix (undated).
14. When the hearings were held on L.B. 149 before the Public Works Commit-
tee of the Nebraska Legislature, several people spoke in favor of defining
"beneficial use" to include fish and wildlife, and recreation. Among the
groups represented were the Izaak Walton League, the Game and Parks
Commission, the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the League of Women
Voters, and the Nebraska Wildlife Federation. Hearing on L.B. 149 Before
the Comm. on Public Works, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. 31 (1977).
15. In 1974, the Department of Water Resources processed applica-
tions for 374 new permits to withdraw water from reservoirs and
streams. In 1975 the number rose to 584. Incredibly, in 1976, they
processed applications for an additional 696. In other words, as the
streams progressively go drier each year, the permits to pump from
them increases [sic]. The Department has the option of saying "no"
when a stream is already over-appropriated, but it has no tools to
allow them to determine which streams can tolerate more with-
drawal, and which cannot.
Rupp, supra note 9, at 3.
16. Id.
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other consumptive uses. This management measure would be directed
toward insuring the best use of our surface water resources on an
environmentally sound basis now, and insure their preservation for
future use, development and quality of life.
17
The problem is that minimum streamflow laws, by their very
nature, are a balance-a balance between economic values
(such as irrigation) and social values (such as fish, wildlife,
recreation, and aesthetics).
It is the purpose of this article to describe the legal problems
behind minimum streamflows and to determine whether a
legislative solution exists. In so doing, this article will examine
how two states, Idaho and Colorado, have approached the
problem.
II. THE LEGAL MEANS OF ESTABLISHING
MINIMUM STREAMFLOWS 18
It is evident that the lowering and dewatering of streams is a
national concern as well as a state concern. Not only Nebraska
but every Western state has experienced the dewatering of
streams to some extent. In some respects the federal govern-
ment has perceived the problem much more quickly than the
states and, through the reserved rights doctrine, 19 and naviga-
tional servitude has acted to correct the problem. The most
important congressional enactment is the Wild and Scenic Riv-
ers Act of 1968.20 Through this act many segments of streams
and rivers have been set aside in their free-flowing condition.
The purpose of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is aptly put in the
congressional declaration of policy:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that
certain selected rivers of the Nation which, with their immediate envi-
ronments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historical, cultural, or other similar values,
17. Pesek, supra note 1, at 4.
18. For a discussion of the legal, environmental, and engineering concerns
about establishing minimum streamflows, see INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS (J.
Orsborn & C. Allman eds. 1976). INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS is the proceedings
of the Symposium and Specialty Conference on Instream Flow Needs
presented by the American Fisheries Society and the American Society of
Civil Engineers in Boise, Idaho, in May 1976.
19. The reserved rights doctrine is premised on the United States' claim to
sufficient minimum streamflows to support forest reserves and other
federal reservations. See United States v. Eagle County Dist. Court, 401
U.S. 520 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See also Reed,
Should Rivers Have Running? Toward Extension of the Reserved Rights
Doctrine to Include Minimum Stream Flows, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 153 (1976).
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976). See Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1970).
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shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their
immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoy-
ment of present and future generations.21
Congress has enacted many other statutes which demonstrate
federal concern over the environmental quality of national for-
ests and federal reserves.22 Although the purpose of this article
is to set forth state solutions to the minimum streamflow prob-
lem, it must always be kept in mind that the federal government
has extensive power through the reserved rights doctrine to set
minimum streamflows, at least where federal reservations are
involved.
Although the federal government has demonstrated concern
for the minimum streamflow problem through the enactment
of statutes such as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, its action has
been limited. Generally the federal government has chosen to
let the states handle the minimum streamflow problem. But if
the states do not act soon to rectify the situation, the federal
government probably will. In the recent Water Resource Policy
Study by the Water Resources Council, 23 it was made clear that
the federal government will not remain on the sideline much
longer. One of the problems recognized in the Water Resource
Policy Study was that water laws "may impair the recognition
of environmental values" and that "water law systems have not
evolved to include instream flow needs or certain offstream
environmental uses."24 One of the options identified by the Wa-
ter Resources Council to combat this problem provided: "State
and local government could be required to adopt strategies pro-
viding for instream flow needs through state law. Federal sanc-
tions, through contracting, licensing and permit approval could
be used to implement this alternative. ' 25 Although a good policy
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1976).
22. See generally Comment, Federal Protection of Instream Values, 57 NEB.
L. REV. 368 (1978); Kiechel, Federal Instream Flow Rights, in 1 INSTEAM
FLOW NEEDS 55 (J. Orsborn & C. Allman eds. 1976). See note 18 supra.
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 36788-95 (1977).
24. Id. at 36793.
25. Id. The Water Resources Council also made it clear that expansion of the
reserved rights doctrine was a viable option:
Establish institutions at the Federal level whereby instream flow
needs could be identified, quantified, and effectively provided for
through specific procedures. These procedures could include full
recognition, exercise, and protection of Federally reserved rights
to water, compensation to holders of valid rights whose uses are
discontinued, either temporarily or permanently, when the water
is needed for these instream uses and ensuring that in future Fed-
eral projects the instream uses have a greater priority than uses
confirmed under contractual arrangements.
Id. (emphasis added).
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argument can be made for not allowing the federal government
to force states into enacting laws, the state legislatures have
procrastinated long enough, especially in the area of establish-
ing minimum streamflow laws.2 6
A. Problems With Existing State Law
The water law systems of most of the states, both in the East and
the West, are deficient in that they fail to give appropriate recognition
to social values of water. These values arise primarily from such
instream uses as fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, and esthet-
ics. The appropriation law of the Western States generally requires
diversion of water from the stream or lake and its application to
beneficial use in order for a water right to be created. Instream values
are thus heavily discounted; water has been diverted from streams to
such an extent that instream values which should have been protected
frequently have been impaired, and sometimes destroyed.
27
This statement from the National Water Commission tells the
story of the inadequacy of state law in protecting minimum
streamflows. Originally, the main purpose of water law was to
preserve the natural flow of water. This theory which developed
at the onset of the Industrial Revolution, served the purpose of
allowing the water to flow from one mill down to the next
without substantial change in condition.28 In riparian states, the
modern rule is that each riparian may make a reasonable use of
the water flowing past his riparian land. Reasonable use no
longer requires the natural flow to go undiminished.29 In appro-
priation states the "actual diversion" requirement that water be
physically diverted from the stream is diametrically opposed to
maintaining the natural flow. Water law in the United States
has, therefore, developed to the point of discounting instream
uses.
New water rights in Nebraska, and in most other Western
states, are obtained through appropriation.30 Therefore, the
26. The National Water Commission has made the following recommendation:
Public rights should be secured through State legislation authoriz-
ing administrative withdrawal or public reservation of sufficient
unappropriated water needed for minimum streamflows in order
to maintain scenic values, water quality, fishery resources, and the
natural stream environment in those watercourses, or parts there-
of, that have primary value for these purposes.
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 279 (1973)
(recommendation 7-39).
27. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POLICY 63
(1973). See also NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 271-79.
28. Trelease, The Legal Basis for Instream Flows, in 2 INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS
1 (J. Orsborn & C. Allman eds. 1976). See note 18 supra.
29. See generally Davis, The Right to Use Water in the Eastern States, in 7
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 611, at 36 (R. Clark ed. 1976).
30. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
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starting point in any legal analysis of the minimum streamflow
problem is to begin with the appropriation doctrine and explain
why that doctrine has failed to adequately protect instream
uses. "The law of appropriation was designed to encourage
people to withdraw water from the stream and apply it to bene-
ficial uses to promote economic development."'3'
To constitute a valid appropriation of water, three elements must
always exist: (1) An intent to apply it to some existing or contemplated
beneficial use; (2) an actual diversion from the natural channel by
some mode sufficient for the purpose; and (3) an application of the
water within a reasonable time to some beneficial use.32
In a state, such as Nebraska, which requires a permit to appro-
priate, the "intent" requirement is of little significance. The
"actual diversion" requirement and the "beneficial use" re-
quirement have caused the most difficulty for those advocating
minimum streamflows. To establish minimum streamflows
under the traditional appropriation doctrine, the instream uses
would have to be "beneficial" and the water would have to be
"diverted."
1. Beneficial Use
The question to be answered is whether fish and wildlife,
recreation, and aesthetics qualify as beneficial uses. "The re-
quirement that a use be beneficial is a prohibition against prac-
tices which are excessively wasteful in comparison with
competing uses. Instream uses are vulnerable to attack as non-
beneficial because a considerable amount of water must be
reserved in place and thus is not available for consumptive
withdrawals. 3 3 It is this comparison between competing uses
that has caused the courts of many states to determine that
instream uses were not beneficial and thus not the proper object
of appropriation. 34 These courts have traditionally compared
31. R. DEWSNUP, LEGAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM WATER VALUES 10 (Nat'l Wa-
ter Comm'n 1971).
32. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 366
(completed by H. Ellis & J. DeBraal, U.S. Dep't Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1206
1971) (quoting Simons v. Inyo Cerro Gordo Mining & Power Co., 48 Cal.
App. 524, 537, 192 P. 144, 150 (1920)). See F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 36-37 (2d
ed. 1974); Clark, The Colorado Doctrine: Surface-Water Rights by Appro-
priation Only, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 409.2, at 107 (R. Clark ed.
1972); Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses
in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871.
33. Tarlock, supra note 32, at 883.
34. What is beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable beneficial use,
where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a rea-
sonable beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need.
What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed
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competing uses on the basis of economic value. A dollar value
can usually be attached to a consumptive use such as irrigation
or power generation, but instream uses are not capable of easy
valuation. Because of this, instream uses have lost the battle
with the more economically favorable consumptive uses. Not
uncommon was the holding in the well known case of Empire
Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co.,35 in which it was
stated that a use could "not be unnecessarily or wastefully ex-
cessive. '36 Some of the early decisions declared such uses as
irrigation,37 domestic needs, 38 stock watering,39 mining,40 and
power to be beneficial uses.41 While some courts continue to
limit beneficial uses to such economic purposes, 42 other courts
have determined that fish, wildlife, and recreation constitute
beneficial uses for the purpose of appropriation. 43 Several of the
Western states have enacted statutes that define recreation to be
a beneficial use: Alaska,44 Arizona,45 California, 46 Colorado,
47
Kansas,48 Montana,49 Nevada,50 North Dakota,51 Oregon,5 2 Tex-
as,53 and Washington5 4 all allow appropriation for recreation of
conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.
Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d
972, 1007 (1935).
35. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
36. Id. at 129.
37. Water-Supply & Storage Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 24 Colo. 322, 51 P.
496 (1897).
38. Silver Peak Mines v. Valcalda, 79 F. 886 (D. Nev. 1897).
39. First State Bank of Alamogordo v. McNew, 33 N.M. 414, 269 P. 56 (1928).
40. Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 20 Mont. 181, 50 P. 416 (1897).
41. For a more extensive list of those uses held to be beneficial, see Clark,
supra note 32, § 408.1, at 66.
42. Id. at 66 n.25.
43. Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Brasher v. Gibson, 2
Ariz. App. 91,406 P.2d 441 (1965); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247
(1933); State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M.
207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
44. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (fish and wildlife).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-141 (Supp. 1977) (recreation, fish, and wildlife).
46. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1977) (recreation, fish, and wildlife).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973) (recreation, fish, and wildlife).
48. KAN. STAT. § 82a-707 (1973) (recreation).
49. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-867(2) (Interim Supp. 1977) (recreation, fish,
and wildlife).
50. NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.030 (1973) (recreation).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.1 (Supp. 1977) (Recreation, fish, and wildlife).
52. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 536.300(1), 537.170(3) (a), 543.225(3) (1975) (recreation, fish,
and wildlife).
53. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 5.023 to 5.024 (Vernon 1972) (recreation, fish,
wildlife).
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020 (Supp. 1976) (recreation, fish, wildlife,
and aesthetics).
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some type. In fact, through court decree or statutory enactment
"the recognition of recreation and scenic beauty as beneficial
uses is now the rule rather than the exception. 5 5 But unlike the
majority of its neighboring states, Nebraska has yet to define
beneficial use to include recreation or fish and wildlife by either
legislative action or judicial decree.56
Because the traditional doctrine of prior appropriation still
requires an actual diversion, the definition of such things as
recreation, fish, and wildlife to be beneficial uses does not
necessarily mean that instream values can be protected through
appropriation. While it might be argued that a legislative decla-
ration that recreation, fish, and wildlife are beneficial uses dem-
onstrates an intent for instream appropriation, it must be re-
membered that these values can be served by lake and pond
impoundments.5 7 For this reason the most important hurdle for
those advocating minimum streamflows to overcome is the
actual diversion requirement.
2. Actual Diversion
When the appropriation doctrine was formalized, the actual
diversion requirement served the purpose of imparting notice to
others that a prior appropriation existed. Prior to the permit
system an actual diversion was the only effective record that a
person had appropriated water.58 The cases that allowed stock
watering and natural overflow irrigation were notable excep-
tions to the diversion requirement,5 9 but stock watering was
considered to require so little water that it did not impair the
operation of the notice system.60 With the permit system pres-
ently in effect in most states, it is doubtful whether the actual
diversion requirement is still appropriate. Nevertheless, many
courts continue to require at least some type of diversion to
perfect a valid appropriation. 61 The most recent case to do so
55. Casenote, In-Stream Appropriation for Recreation and Scenic Beauty, 12
IDAHO L. REV. 263, 270 (1976). The student author points out that only
Montana allows appropriation by private parties for recreation or scenic
beauty. Id.
56. See note 114 and accompanying text infra.
57. Lake and pond impoundments typically do require an actual diversion, as
do recreational uses such as water skiing.
58. C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIA-
TION SYSTEM 7 (Nat'l Water Comm'n 1971).
59. Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772 (1931) (stock water-
ing); In re Silvies River, 115 Or. 27, 237 P. 322 (1925) (overflow irrigation).
60. C. MEYERS, supra note 58, at 7. Instream uses would also seem to require
very little water. By their very nature they are nonconsumptive.
61. See Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 453 (1888); Sherlock v. Greaves, 106
Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87 (1938); Gates v. Settlers' Milling, Canal & Reservoir
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was State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda.6 2 In Miranda the ap-
propriator claimed he had a valid appropriation through the
natural irrigation of grass which was used for grazing and har-
vesting. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a "man-
made diversion, together with intent to apply water to beneficial
use and actual application of the water to beneficial use, is
necessary to claim water rights by appropriation in New Mexico
for agricultural purposes. '63
Colorado case law appears to require only that the water be
put to a beneficial purpose; and while beneficial purposes usu-
ally require an actual diversion, such diversion is not necessary
if the purpose is indeed beneficial. 64 The Colorado Supreme
Court in Genoa v. Westfall65 held that where a pond was formed
by the natural flow of a river, an actual diversion was not re-
quired to perfect an appropriation.66
While there is authority on both sides, the general weight of
that authority is in favor of the actual diversion requirement. 67
This requirement will continue to defeat appropriations for in-
stream uses until the courts and state legislatures realize that
the purpose for it no longer exists. If a use is beneficial there
appears to be no logical reason to require a diversion. The
ultimate utility of water should not be determined by diversion
but by what use carries the most benefit.
Co., 19 Okla. 83, 91 P. 856 (1907); Hutchinson v. Stricklin, 146 Or. 285, 28 P.2d
225 (1933); Crawford v. Lehi Irr. Co., 10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960);
McPhail v. Forney, 4 Wyo. 556,35 P. 773 (1894). But see State Dep't of Parks
v. State Dep't of Water Adm'n, 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). See
generally 2 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 1243-44 (2d ed. 1912);
1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 32, at 366; 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES §§ 364-367, at 390-98 (3d ed. 1911); Clark, supra note 32, §
409.2, at 107.
62. 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972). See Comment, The Prerequisite of a Man-
Made Diversion in the Appropriation of Water Rights, 13 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 170 (1973).)
63. 83 N.M. at 445, 493 P.2d at 411.
64. Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794
(1886) (natural depression in streambed may be used as a reservoir without
actual diversion); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
65. 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
66. Id. at 546-47, 349 P.2d at 378. The court relied on the Nevada Supreme
Court decision in Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772
(1931). Gulley involved livestock watering, which has long been recognized
as an exception to the actual diversion requirement. See note 59 and ac-
companying text supra.
67. It appears that most of the cases that do not require an actual diversion
either involve a natural impoundment or fit within the stock watering and
natural overflow irrigation exceptions.
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B. Legislative Alternatives within the Constitutional Framework
Idaho,68 Colorado, 69 and Nebraska,70 are the only appropria-
tion states that have the term "divert" written into their
constitutions. The basic constitutional provisions of these states
provide that "the right to divert the unappropriated waters of
any natural stream for beneficial purposes shall never be de-
nied."71 Both Idaho and Colorado have taken the initial steps to
establish minimum streamflows in the face of this constitution-
al provision and these steps will herein be analyzed. The Ne-
braska situation will then be compared with the situations in
Idaho and Colorado in order to determine what legislative alter-
natives are open to Nebraska.7 2
1. The Idaho Approach
In 1971 the Idaho Legislature authorized7 3 the Idaho Depart-
ment of Parks to appropriate for the people of Idaho the natural
spring waters of the Malad Canyon. 74 With this single enactment
the Idaho Legislature declared recreation and scenic beauty to
be beneficial uses and authorized a state agency to make a valid
appropriation for such use. By implication the legislature de-
clared that an actual physical diversion was.not required. This
enactment took place in light of the Idaho constitution which
68. IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3.
69. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
70. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
71. Id. The Constitutions of Idaho and Colorado contain similar language.
72. The legislative alternative is the only one analyzed here because it is obvi-
ous that if a state wants to revamp its constitution, any type of framework
is possible. For this reason, this article focuses on what Nebraska can do
within the constitutional framework.
73. The statute provided:
The state park board . . . is hereby authorized and directed to
appropriate in trust for the people of the state of Idaho the unap-
propriated natural spring flow arising upon the area described as
follows....
The preservation of water in the area described for its scenic beau-
ty and recreational purposes necessary and desirable for all citi-
zens of the state of Idaho is hereby declared to be a beneficial use of
such water.
The park board . . .or its successor, shall be deemed to be the
holder of such permit, in trust for the people of the state, and the
public use of the unappropriated water in the specific area herein
described is declared to be of greater priority than any other use
except that of domestic consumption.
IDAHO CODE § 67-4307 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the Malad Canyon
Statute].
74. The Malad Canyon is located in Gooding County, Idaho, in the southeast-
ern part of the state.
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provides in part: "The right to divert and appropriate the unap-
propriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses,'shall
never be denied, except that the state may regulate and limit the
use thereof for power purposes. "75 This provision then goes on to
list the order of preferences. The order is domestic, which has
the highest preference, followed by agriculture and manufac-
turing, with mining carrying a higher preference than agricul-
ture and manufacturing when carried on in an organized min-
ing district.76
As a result of the enactment of the Malad Canyon statute the
Idaho Department of Parks filed for a permit with the Idaho
Department of Water Administration. Numerous complaints
were received and the Department of Water Administration
denied the permit because there was to be no actual diversion.
This decision was appealed to the district court which found
that a physical diversion was not required, and that the permit
should be issued. This decision was in turn appealed to the
Idaho Supreme Court in State Department of Parks v. State
Department of Water.77 The court was faced with three
constitutional issues: (1) can a state agency appropriate water
for the benefit of all the people; (2) are scenic beauty and recrea-
tion valid beneficial uses; and (3) is an actual diversion required
to claim a valid water right?
78
The argument advanced for denying a state agency the right
to appropriate water was that the constitution provided that the
"right to divert and appropriate. .. shall never be denied" and
the appropriation of water by a state agency was in effect deny-
ing the right of private parties to appropriate such water. The
court pointed out that the constitution was not limited to private
parties, and the state or state agencies had the authority to
appropriate water for the public. The court noted that "[wle
deem it common knowledge and it is pointed out in the decision
of the Department of Water Administration that in Idaho and
throughout the western states, state agencies frequently appro-
priate water. '7
9
75. IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3.
76. Id.
77. State Dep't of Parks v. State Dep't of Water Administration, 96 Idaho 440,
530 P.2d 924 (1974). For a discussion of Ma lad Canyon, see Casenote, supra
note 55.
78. 96 Idaho at 441-42, 530 P.2d at 925-26.
79. Id. There was no authority given for this proposition, but under a "see
also" signal the court referred to 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 32, at 250-51. At
this citation Mr. Hutchins discusses California, Montana, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Utah. None of these states' constitutions provide that the
"right to appropriate shall never be denied."
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The next issue raised was whether scenic beauty and recrea-
tion were valid beneficial uses. The argument advanced against
such uses being beneficial under the constitution was that the
list of preferences contained in the constitution was exclusive,
that is, only irrgation, domestic uses, power, mining, and manu-
facturing were beneficial. The court held that the list was not
exclusive and that the legislature could define the generic term
"beneficial use," concluding that it was for the legislature to
determine which uses were beneficial.80
The final issue determined by the court was whether an
actual physical diversion was required by the wording of the
constitution. The court noted that its prior holdings 81 required
an actual physical diversion but attributed this requirement to
the statutes. 82 Without actually discussing the wording of the
constitution, the court held that the Idaho "Constitution does
not require actual physical diversion."8
3
There were two strong dissenting opinions in State Depart-
ment of Parks v. State Department of Water Administration.
In one of these opinions, it was argued that an appropriation by
a state agency is just another name for denying the people the
right to appropriate, which was forbidden by the Idaho
Constitution.84 This would appear to be a valid conclusion. Al-
though it is clear from a reading of the constitutional provision
that Idaho cannot withdraw water from appropriation, this is
effectively what the Idaho Legislature has done. The dissenting
To hold that state agencies could appropriate water, the Idaho Supreme
Court had to overrule the case of Board v. Enking, 56 Idaho 772,58 P.2d 779
(1936). In Enking the court stated that a state agency could not appropriate
water. The court in the Malad Canyon decision said that this was dicta on
the part of the Enking court and that to the extent Enking was inconsis-
tent, it was overruled. 96 Idaho at 443, 530 P.2d at 927-28.
80. 96 Idaho at 443-44, 530 P.2d at 927.
81. Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d 1029 (1972);
Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059 (1909);
Sand Point Water and Light Co. v. Panhandle Dev. Co., 11 Idaho 405, 83 P.
347 (1905).
82. 97 Idaho at 444, 530 P.2d at 928.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 453, 530 P.2d at 937 (McFadden, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted
with approval the following:
In Idaho the governor is authorized to appropriate the water of
certain lakes in trust for the people, and the preservation of the
lakes for scenic beauty, health, and recreation purposes is declared
to be a beneficial use of the water, although in reality this is not an
appropriation, but like the Oregon laws a reservation of the water
to prevent its being appropriated for more mundane purposes.
Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface
Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 12 (1957), quoted in State Dep't of Parks v. State
Dep't of Water Adm'n, 96 Idaho at 453, 530 P.2d at 937.
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opinion agreed with the majority opinion that scenic beauty and
recreation are beneficial uses, but qualified this by stating that
what is presently a beneficial use may not be one in the future
and that a comparison between two conflicting uses must be
made:
It is beyond dispute that scenic beauty and recreation are both of
vital importance to modern day life in Idaho. . . . [T]he effect of a
proposed appropriation upon scenic beauty and rebreation can and
should be considered in determining whether the use contemplated is
"beneficial" within the meaning of the Constitution.... In other
words, where the benefits of a proposed use are outweighed by the
attendant detriment to scenic beauty and recreation, the use is not a
"beneficial use," and the application for a permit to appropriate pub-
lic waters for that use should be denied. As always, the question of
beneficial use must be determined on a case by case basis.
85
The other dissenting opinion argued that an actual physical
diversion was required to perfect a valid appropriation and,
therefore, scenic beauty and recreation were not the proper
objects of an appropriation. The first point raised by this dis-
senting opinion was that the general appropriation statutes of
Idaho required a diversion in order to get a permit and license.86
The second point was that the prior holdings of the court had
required an actual physical diversion and that those cases rest-
ed upon the language of the constitution and not the statutes.
8 7
Through the Malad Canyon statute and the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in State Department of Parks v. State Depart-
ment of Water Administration, the state of Idaho has provided
for the preservation of instream values. It is interesting to note
that the Malad Canyon appropriation was not the only appro-
priation that was authorized by the Idaho Legislature; several
lakes8" as well as streams89 have been provided for-some by
appropriation by the governor and some by the park and recre-
ation board.
85. 96 Idaho at 453-54, 530 P.2d at 937-38 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
86. The majority handled this argument by stating that although the general
appropriation statutes do require a diversion, the Malad Canyon statute
was more specific and, therefore, should be given preference. For this
reason the appropriation of the spring water in the Malad Canyon did not
have to comply with the general appropriation laws requiring the location
and description of the physical diversion to be included on the application
for a permit to appropriate water. Id. at 445, 530 P.2d at 929.
87. The majority concluded that the prior cases relied only upon the statutory
requirement of a diversion and not the Idaho Constitution. See notes 81-82
and accompanying text supra.
88. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4301 to 4306 (1973).
89. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4307 to 4311 (Supp. 1977).
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2. The Colorado Approach
In 1973 the Colorado Legislature enacted into law what has
been commonly referred to as a Senate Bill 97.90 Senate Bill 97
accomplished three simple goals: (1) it removed the term "diver-
sion" from the statutory definition of appropriation,91 (2) it sub-
stituted the word "use" for "divert" in the statutory definition of
priority,92 and (3) it defined the appropriation of minimum
streamflows as a beneficial use.93 Most importantly, it au-
thorized the acquisition of water rights by a state agency:
Further recognizing the need to correlate the activities of mankind
with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment, the
Colorado water conservation board is hereby vested with the authori-
ty, on behalf of the people of Colorado, to appropriate in a manner
consistent with sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the state constitution,
or acquire, such waters of natural streams and lakes as may be re-
quired to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
Prior to the initiation of any such appropriation, the board shall re-
quest recommendations from the division of wildlife and the division
of parks and outdoor recreation. Nothing in this article shall be
construed as authorizing any state agency to acquire water by emi-
nent domain, or to deprive the people of the state of Colorado of the
beneficial use of those waters available by law and interstate
compact.9 4
The Colorado Attorney General has put this statute to good use.
As of March 1978, the Attorney General on behalf of the
Colorado Water Conservation Board had made application for
appropriations for 419 lakes and 2200 miles of natural stream
segments within the state of Colorado.95
90. Act Providing for the Appropriation of Water to Protect the Natural Envi-
ronment, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-
102 to 103 (1973)) [hereinafter cited as Senate Bill 97].
91. " 'Appropriation' means the divrzicn ef a rtairn pertizn ef the watrsa C
thetateand the application of te-sa neA CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
WATERS OF THE STATE to a beneficial use." 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521.
92. "'Priority' means the seniority by date as of which a water right is entitled
to eli'er USE or conditional water right will be entitled to d4et USE
.....
Id.93. "Beneficial use" is the use of that amount of water that is rea-
sonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation
is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of the forego-
ing, includes the impoundment of water for recreational purposes,
including fishery or wildlife. For the benefit and enjoyment of
present and future generations, "beneficial use"shall also include
the appropriation by the state of Colorado in the manner pre-
scribed by law of such minimum flows between specific points or
levels for and on natural streams and lakes as are required to
preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 37-92-102(3)(emphasis added).
95. Telephone interview with David W. Robbins, Dep. Att'y Gen. of Colorado
(Mar. 14, 1978). In May 1976, the Attorney General had made application for
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There are several cases at the trial level which raise the
constitutionality of Senate Bill 97. Although a decision from the
Colorado Supreme Court will take some time, the constitution-
ality of Senate Bill 97 is being presently reviewed by a trial
court.96 The issues are basically the same as those decided by
the Idaho Supreme Court in State Department of Parks v. State
Department of Water Administration:97 (1) whether it is
constitutionally permissible for the legislature to authorize the
appropriation of water by a state agency; (2) whether the legisla-
ture can constitutionally define beneficial use to include
minimum streamflows; and (3) whether an actual diversion is
constitutionally mandated in order to perfect an appropriation
of water. The Colorado Constitution provides that the "water of
every natural stream ... is dedicated to the use of the people of
the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." 98 It
also states that the "right to divert the unappropriated waters
of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be de-
nied." 99
As to whether Senate Bill 97 is constitutional in its authoriza-
tion of appropriation of water by a state agency, it is important
to note that it allows the agency to appropriate the water it
deems necessary to preserve the natural environment.1 0 0 This is
in contrast to the Malad Canyon statute in which the Idaho
Legislature made the determination of which water to appropri-
ate.' 0 ' It would seem that the Malad Canyon statute is more of a
direct denial of the right to appropriate than is Senate Bill 97. In
Senate Bill 97 the agency is really acting as a private citizen
would, appropriating the water it deems necessary, while the
Malad Canyon statute is a legislative determination of which
water is no longer subject to appropriation. Another important
or received appropriations for 256 lakes and 87 stream segments. Robbins,
Quantification of Instream Flow Needs by Law in Colorado, in 2 IN-
STREAm FLOW NEEDS 184, 200 (J. Orsborn & C. Allman eds. 1976). See note
18 supra.
96. Letter from David W. Robbins, Dep. Att'y Gen. of Colo., to Lynn Hendrix
(Nov. 17, 1977). The parties to one of the lawsuits have stipulated to the facts
necessary to determine the constitutionality of Senate Bill 97. The brief
date for the opponents to Senate Bill 97 was Nov. 30, 1977, and the an-
swering brief date for the Colorado Attorney General was December 30,
1977. Id.; In re Application of Water Rights of the Colorado Water Conser-
vation Bd., W-2720, W-2721 & W-2776 (Water Court for Water Div. No. 5,
1977).
97. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
98. COLO. CONST. art XVI, § 5 (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
100. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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distinction is that the Malad Canyon statute denied all appropri-
ation by private citizens by requiring the agency to appropriate
all the water of the canyon whereas Senate Bill 97, in effect,
only denies appropriation of the minimum levels needed to pro-
tect the environment. That water over and above this minimum
level is still open to appropriation by private individuals. It
would appear that in this regard Senate Bill 97 is less of a denial
to appropriate than was the Malad Canyon statute and, there-
fore, Senate Bill 97 is less suspect than the Malad Canyon stat-
ute.10
2
As to whether it is constitutional for the legislature to define
"beneficial use" to include minimum streamflows, the Colorado
case law appears to be favorable to such a definition. The
Colorado Supreme Court has held that the constitution does not
define beneficial use and that what is a beneficial use is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the trial court. 0 3 The more
difficult hurdle for the proponents of Senate Bill 97 is the actual
diversion requirement. Although the Colorado Legislaturehas
removed the actual diversion requirement from the statutes,104 a
fairly recent Colorado Supreme Court decision held that a state
agency could not appropriate for fish within a stream because
there was no actual diversion. 0 5 It is uncertain whether this
case relied upon statutory, common law, or constitutional
grounds. 10 6
A constitutional issue raised by Senate Bill 97 that was not
raised by the Malad Canyon statute is whether an agency can
102. Of course there is no requirement that a Colorado court give precedent
value to an Idaho decision, but at least there is precedent for such a
determination.
103. Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (1939).
104. See notes 91-92 supra.
105. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 158
Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
106. "There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition that a
minimum flow of water may be 'appropriated' in a natural stream for
piscatorial purposes without diversion of any portion of the water 'appro-
priated' from the natural course of the stream." Id. at 335, 406 P.2d at 800.
Of course if it is determined that diversion is a constitutional requirement
of the Colorado Constitution, the legislature could not change this require-
ment.
For Colorado decisions requiring an actual diversion, see Denver v.
Miller, 149 Colo. 96, 368 P.2d 982 (1962); Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Rocky Mtn. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351,79 P.2d 373 (1938). Contra,
Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533,349 P.2d 370 (1960); Larimer County Reser-
voir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886); Thomas v.
Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
722 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 3 (1978)
acquire water. 10 7 The word acquire implies the normal require-
ments of appropriation might not have to be met, that is, acquis-
ition doesn't require an actual diversion to a beneficial use.
Again, proponents of Senate Bill 97 will have problems. The
Colorado Constitution states that all water in the state is subject
to appropriation. 10 8
A non-constitutional question that is raised by Senate Bill 97
is how much water is actually needed to protect the environ-
ment. Under Senate Bill 97 only the water needed to preserve
the natural environment to a reasonable degree is declared to be
beneficial. 0 9 This means that the Colorado Water Conservation
Board must prove what levels of flow are needed. The amount
needed to protect fish and wildlife can be shown through the
expert testimony of biologists, 1 0 but the amount needed to pro-
tect recreation and scenic beauty is not as easily proved. For
this reason the Colorado Water Conservation Board has not
attempted to appropriate water for these purposes."'
Not all legal questions raised by Senate Bill 97 have been
discussed in this article. 1 2 Suffice to say that the Colorado
Legislature has taken a giant step forward in the protection of
minimum streamflows, but several questions, both legal and
practical, remain to be answered.
3. Possible Approaches for Nebraska
As stated earlier, Idaho, Colorado, and Nebraska are the
only states that have the word "divert" in their constitutional
provisions directing that waters are subject to appropriation by
the people." 3 Idaho and Colorado have at least taken the initial
steps to preserve minimum flows, but the Nebraska Legislature
has not acted. In the eighty-fifth legislative session the Nebras-
ka Legislature considered Legislative Bill 149 which defined
107. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
110. Robbins, supra note 95, at 190-91.
111. Id. at 192.
112. For a complete discussion of the anticipated problems that the proponents
of Senate Bill 97 will have, see id. 184-201.
113. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
In fact, the requirement that appropriation be the means of acquiring
water rights is only constitutionally mandated in ten of the Western states.
ALAsKA CONST. art. 8, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (by negative implica-
tions); CAL. CONST. art. 14, § 3; CoLo. CONST. art. 16, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art.
15, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; N.M. CONST. art.
XVI, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (by implication); Wyo. CONST. art. 8, § 3.
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beneficial use to include "recreation, fish and wildlife.""14 As a
student commentator has pointed out, this bill would not have
established minimum streamflows in Nebraska but would have
been a step in the right direction.115 While the Nebraska Legisla-
ture has up to this point failed to act, it, more than the legisla-
tures of Colorado or Idaho, probably has the constitutional
framework which would allow great advances in the preserva-
tion of minimum streamflows. The constitution first declares
the use of water for domestic uses and irrigation to be a natural
want.116 The constitution then provides that "[t]he use of the
water of every natural stream within the State of Nebraska is
hereby dedicated to the people of the state for beneficial pur-
poses, subject to the provisions of the following section.""17 Sec-
tion six of article fifteen of the constitution then provides:
The right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream
for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is
demanded by the public interest. Priority of appropriation shall give
the better right as between those using the water for the same pur-
poses, but when the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for
the use of all those desiring to use the same, those using the water for
domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming it for
any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural pur-
poses shall have the preference over those using the same for manu-
facturing purposes. Provided, no inferior right to the use of the waters
114. As used in chapter 46, article 2, Reissue Revised Statutes of Ne-
braska, 1943, and amendments thereto, beneficial use shall mean
the use of water for domestic, livestock, municipal, irrigation,
manufacturing, power, recreation, fish and wildlife, ground water
recharge and storage, waste assimilation, navigation, and any
other purpose having public value.
L.B. 149, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1977).
At present, the Nebraska Supreme Court has articulated only one
definition of beneficial use: "While many elements must be considered in
determining whether water has been put to beneficial use, one is that it
shall not exceed the least amount of water that experience indicates is
necessary in the exercise of good husbandry for the production of crops."
Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827,832,284 N.W. 326,329 (1939). This
definition, of course, goes not to what uses are beneficial but to the amount
that is beneficial. Note, The Impact of Defining "Beneficial Use" Upon
Nebraska Water Appropriation Law, 57 NEB. L. REv. 199, 201 (1978).
It is interesting to note that the declaration of legislative purpose for the
Nebraska Environmental Protection Act states that it is the public policy
"[tlo conserve the water in this state and to protect and improve the quality
of water for human consumption, wildlife, fish and other aquatic life,
industry, recreation and other productive beneficial uses . . . ." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-1501 (Reissue 1976) (emphasis added). Although this is not
an actual "definition," it does demonstrate legislative consideration of the
environmental importance of the state's wildlife. It also demonstrates that
the legislature acknowledges that fish and wildlife are beneficial.
115. Note, supra note 114, at 207-08.
116. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
117. Id. § 5.
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of this state shall be acquired by a superior right without just compen-
sation therefore to the inferior user.
1 1 8
It is readily apparent that this section is similar to the Idaho
and Colorado provisions with one major exception. That excep-
tion is that the right to divert can be denied when "demanded by
the public interest." Not only would the Colorado and Idaho
alternatives to the minimum streamflow problem be within the
reach of the Nebraska Legislature but this exception appears to
allow the actual withdrawal of water from appropriation.
The history behind this exception demonstrates that the
framers of the constitutional provision wanted the Nebraska
Legislature to decide when a denial to appropriate was in the
public interest. In 1895 the twenty-fourth session of the Nebras-
ka Legislature enacted a similar statute which provided: "The
right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream
for beneficial use shall never be denied."'119 At the time of the
constitutional convention of 1919 and 1920, this provision re-
mained in the statutes.1 0 From this provision came the follow-
ing proposal to the convention: "The right to divert unapprop-
riated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall
never be denied to the State, to any county and municipality
within the state and to any district formed for that purpose by
general law, nor to any other subdivisions of the State.' ' 21 The
provision was then amended in committee to read as it presently
does. 22 Statements by the chairman of the committee explain
the exception:
That is, if this becomes a part of the Constitution, the Legislature of
the State of Nebraska will have no right to pass any law which will
deny to any individual, corporation, association or district formed for
that purpose, or municipal bodies, the right to appropriate unapprop-
riated waters of the stream except when such denial is demanded by
public interests.
118. Id. § 6 (emphasis added). The Nebraska Supreme Court has said of this
provision that
[a] right of appropriating, under our Constitution, whether for irri-
gation or for power purposes, is a property right which is entitled to
the same protection as any other property right. The right of prop-
erty therein cannot be violated with impunity any more than that in
any other type of property. This is so fundamental that citations of
authority are unnecessary.
Loup River Public Power Dist. v. North Loup River Public Power & Irr.
Dist., 142 Neb. 141, 152-53, 5 N.W.2d 240, 247-48 (1942).
119. 1895 Neb. Laws ch. 69, § 43, at 260 (codified at NEB. C.S. ch. 93a, art. 2, § 5486
(1897)).
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 3372 (1913).
121. JOURNAL OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 193 (Proceedings
of the Neb. Const. Conv'n, 1919-1920, Dec. 16, 1919).
122. Id. vol. 2, at 1913 (Mar. 8, 1920).
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It would not affect vested rights in any manner .... It simply
recognizes, as far as this proposal is concerned, the law as it is in
existence now, modified by this position that the legislature might
deny an appropriation of water provided it is for the public inter-
ests.123
The clear import of these statements is that when the Nebraska
Legislature determines that it is in the public interest, it may
deny further appropriation. Therefore, the Nebraska Legisla-
ture probably has the constitutional means to preserve
minimum streamflows. This would not have to be accom-
plished through agency appropriation as was done in Idaho and
Colorado, but rather the Nebraska Legislature could accom-
plish such a goal by denying further appropriations when a
stream level would be reduced beyond the level needed to sus-
tain the natural environment.
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF MINIMUM
STREAMFLOW LAWS
After it has been determined that minimum streamflows
should be preserved, and that the legal means exist to accom-
plish this goal, it must then be determined in what manner this
goal should be accomplished. In other words, it must be deter-
mined what approaches and strategies exist to best effectuate
minimum streamflows. 124 There are basically four such strate-
gies: (1) the appropriation by private individuals, (2) legislative
withdrawals, (3) agency withdrawals, and (4) agency appropria-
tions.
Whether minimum flows should be accomplished through
appropriation by private individuals is open to debate.125 Yet a
judicial or statutory decree that instream uses are beneficial
and that an actual diversion is not a requirement of appropria-
tion would allow such a result. Fish and wildlife, recreation, and
especially aesthetics are public benefits; they should not be
allowed to be monopolized by a few to the detriment of the
public. To ensure the benefits, both direct and indirect, of
123. Id. at 1915-17 (statement of Mr. Beeler, Chairman of the Comm. on Irr.,
Drainage, Water Power & Nat. Resources) (emphasis added).
The legislative history does not indicate what actually is in the "public
interest" or what factors the legislature must consider in making the deter-
mination that a denial of appropriation is in the public interest.
124. For a comprehensive list of possible techniques for protecting minimum
stream flows, see Dewsnup, Protecting Instream Flows UnderState Laws,
in 1 INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS 17 (J. Orsborn & C. Allman eds. 1976). See note
18 supra.
125. Id. at 43-44.
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minimum streamflows, instream uses should be protected by
public rather than private rights. 2 6 It is the natural environ-
ment that is being protected by minimum streamflows and it is
the public to whom this benefit runs. There are times when
private rights should advisably be created, such as the appropri-
ation of a waterfall for a resort,12 7 but here again the public is
the ultimate beneficiary. At present, only Washington has al-
lowed an appropriation for instream uses by a private citizen. 128
The next possible approach to protecting minimum flows is
by legislative withdrawal from appropriation. This is clearly a
constitutional means of protecting instream uses in Nebras-
ka.12 9 Most of the existing data on streams are inconclusive. It is
usually difficult to determine how much water from a stream
has been appropriated and how much water is left in the stream.
The withdrawal of a stream from appropriation would allow the
protection of minimum flows without the specific data required
to make an appropriation of the remaining water. 130 Oregon is
one state in which the legislature has withdrawn certain waters
from appropriation. 131 But there are serious drawbacks to legis-
lative withdrawal. First, the legislature does not have the exper-
tise needed to determine what waters should or should not be
withdrawn from appropriatiop, Second, the legislature is a
political body influenced by its constituency. In time of short-
age, when minimum flows are needed the most, legislators will
likely bow to wishes of the irrigators who most likely make up a
majority of their constituency. Finally, when it is determined
126. Tarlock, supra note 32, at 875.
127. Such was the case in Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205
F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
128. A biologist in Washington applied for a permit to appropriate water for the
purpose of propagating fish. Although he was originally denied the permit
because no actual diversion was to be used, he later obtained the permit to
appropriate the water. Although this appears to be an appropriation by a
private individual, the Pollution Control Hearing Board of Washington, in
granting the permit, stated: "Nor do we regard this application as in any
sense the establishment of minimum flow by private action." F. TRELEASE,
supra note 32, at 37-38 (quoting 5 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. NEWSLETTER No.
8 (1972) (Water Law Issue), which quotes In re Bevan v. Dep't of Ecology,
PCHB No. 48).
The author of Casenote, supra note 55, states that Montana allows
appropriation by private individuals. Id. at 269-70. This no longer appears
to be the case. In 1977 Montana enacted a new water code which provides
that "'[aippropriate' means to divert, impound, or withdraw (including by
stock for stock water) a quantity of water or, in the case of a public agency,
to reserve water in accordance with 89-890." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-
867 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
129. See § II-B-3 of text supra.
130. Dewsnup, supra note 124, at 31-32.
131. OR. REV. STAT §§ 538.110 to .300 (1975).
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that a minimum flow level is needed in a stream, the time it
would take to get a bill enacted to establish such minimum level
would be unduly prohibitive.
The third possible approach to establishing minimum flow is
to allow a state agency to withdraw water from appropria-
tion. 132 In Nebraska it is questionable whether such a system is
constitutionally permissible. The Nebraska Constitution allows
withdrawal only in the public interest.133 Therefore, the ques-
tion is whether the Legislature can delegate its authority to an
agency to determine when a withdrawal is in the public interest
or whether this determination is the sole function of the legisla-
ture. This problem could be minimized by having the legislature
set up guidelines and policies outlining when the agency is to
withdraw the streams from further appropriation. This is the
type of system set up in Washington where the Department of
Water Resources is authorized to reserve quantities of water for
fish and wildlife and recreation upon the recommendation of
wildlife agencies.134 In Mississippi, 135 the Board of Water
Commissioners is directed to reserve from appropriation the
average minimum flow. 136 The average minimum flow is de-
fined to be the "average of the minimum daily flow occurring
during each of the five lowest years in the period of the preced-
ing twenty consecutive years."' 37 The main problem with agen-
cy withdrawal is that the agency that withdraws the water is
usually the same agency that adjudicates water rights, thus
creating a conflict of interest. Agency withdrawal has proved to
be a valuable method for protecting minimum flows, but it does
not offer the flexibility available through agency appropriation.
The fourth, and last, alternative is agency appropriation.138
This is what Colorado' 39 has done with Senate Bill 97, and to a
lesser extent what Idaho140 has donewith the enactment of the
Malad Canyon statute. In many respects this method is far
superior to the other methods. Here again, one must question
132. Dewsnup, supra note 124, at 29-30.
133. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
134. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1976). See also Dewsnup, supra
note 124, at 29-30.
135. Mississippi is one of the few Eastern states that uses the doctrine of appro-
priation.
136. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7(3) (1973).
137. Id. § 51-3-3(3)(i).
138. See Dewsnup, supra note 124, at 30-31.
139. See § II-B-2 of text supra.
140. See § II-B-1 of text supra.
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the constitutionality of such a method.1 4 1 If such a system were
adopted it would allow an independent state agency, such as the
Game and Parks Commission, to determine what minimum
flows are needed to preserve the natural environment. Such a
determination would not have to rely on policies explicitly dic-
tated by the legislature. Whereas agency withdrawal would
most likely be the responsibility of the State Department of
Water Resources, agency appropriation could be accomplished
through the Game and Parks Commission or some other inde-
pendent agency. This would allow the agency responsible for
the appropriation to act as an advocate for the natural environ-
ment. This type of agency would also be more apt to have the
expertise necessary to evaluate the minimum flow require-
ments and the needs of the environment.
It could be argued that legislative withdrawal, agency with-
drawal, and agency appropriation are just different titles for
the same method. However, whether the natural environment is
protected to an adequate degree could depend on who is pro-
tecting it and how it is being protected. Therefore, probably the
most important consideration when enacting minimum stream-
flow laws is how such laws should be administered and who
should administer them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past few years have demonstrated that water, like any
other natural resource, is exhaustible. It is evident from the
dewatering of Nebraska streams that the water laws of Nebras-
ka have not kept up with the needs of the environment. The
increased use of irrigation in the state has caused several
streams to become seasonally dry, and eventually will cause
others to do so if adequate laws are not enacted to prevent it.
Because the dewatering of streams is caused by a combination
of surface water withdrawals and groundwater mining,
minimum streamflows can only be accomplished through a
comprehensive water plan-a water plan in which groundwa-
ter 142 as well as surface water withdrawals are limited to levels
sufficient to protect the natural environment and one that re-
141. Of course there is authority that such an appropriation is constitutional.
See State Dep't of Parks v. State Dep't of Water Adm'n, 96 Idaho 440, 530
P.2d 924 (1974).
142. Two states presently provide that the quantity of water withdrawn from a
groundwater source cannot exceed the natural recharge. See IDAHO CODE §
42-237a(g) (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-2 (Supp. 1977). See also
Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
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cognizes the connection between groundwater and surface
water.
When enacting such a water plan, the legislature should first
look at what is being protected by minimum streamflow laws. A
plan should take into account the fact that irrigation and the
environment must exist in harmony and, therefore, water laws
must strike a balance between these two concerns. No person
would question the benefits that irrigation has brought to the
Nebraska economy, but irrigation cannot proceed unrestrained
as it has in the past few years. If the use of irrigation continues
to grow at the present rate it will not only cause streams to
become dry but eventually aquifers as well. Thus minimum
flow laws would not only protect the environment but existing
water rights as well.
The means exist for establishing minimum streamflow laws,
but the legislature must act quickly. Although much has been
lost, much remains, and there is still time to protect what does
remain. Water has been termed our most valuable resource. The
law must now recognize that this valuable resource is limited.
Dean Trelease has summed up the problem:
The law will protect and foster the greatest values of water. I have
been called that rare bird, a legal optimist, for taking the position that
the law is what people make it, that if the law doesn't suit you, you may
change it. But I have grown tired of hearing that the law is a barrier to
wise and good water use, as if the law were some malevolent creature
with a life of its own, or as if it were the creation of lawyers whose aim
was to complicate transactions and cause trouble between people in
order to raise the demand for legal services. Laws are made by people:
people with conflicting interests ask the judge to decide which per-
son's interest is to be preferred, people with interests to foster elect
legislators who will protect and further those interests. A person who
grouses that the law is wrong is either wrong himself or in the minori-
ty; if he is right and in the minority he should persuade enough others
of his rightness to procure a change.
143
Lynn Parker Hendrix '78
143. Trelease, supra note 28, at 2.
